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This paper studies how directorsreputational concerns a¤ect board structure, corporate
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rm value. In our setting, directors a¤ect their rmsgovernance, and
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rmsdemand for new directors. Whether the labor mar-
ket rewards a shareholder-friendly or management-friendly reputation is determined in
equilibrium and depends on aggregate governance. We show that directorsdesire to be
invited to other boards creates strategic complementarity of corporate governance across
rms. Directorsreputational concerns amplify the governance system: strong systems
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Introduction
Why do corporate boards look the way they do? Are boards structured optimally to maximize
shareholder value, and how do board regulations a¤ect their composition? To a large extent,
the structure of corporate boards is governed by the labor market for directors. On the demand
side, rms decide which directors to invite based on directorsreputation and on the preferences
of those controlling the nomination process. On the supply side, directors seek to develop their
reputation in order to gain more board seats and thereby obtain prestige, power, compensation,
and access to valuable networks. Thus, directorsreputation plays an important role, a¤ecting
both directorsactions and the structure of corporate boards.
A number of recent institutional and regulatory changes to the director selection process
have a¤ected the labor market for directors and the value of reputation. They include a
shift from plurality to majority voting, proxy access proposals, restrictions on the number of
directorships, and increased boardroom transparency. However, the e¤ect of these factors is
not well understood, and some of the recent changes are subject to much debate.1 In this
paper we shed light on these issues by developing a theory of the labor market for directors
and studying how directorsreputational concerns a¤ect board structure, directorsbehavior,
and ultimately shareholder value.
Our key observation is that directors care about two conicting types of reputation, and
which type of reputation is rewarded more in the labor market depends on the aggregate qual-
ity of corporate governance. If governance is strong and boards of other rms protect the
interests of their shareholders, then building a reputation for being shareholder-friendly can
help one obtain more directorships. Conversely, if governance is weak and boards of other rms
are captured by managers who want to maintain power, then building a management-friendly
reputation can be more useful in getting additional board seats. The empirical evidence is
consistent with the importance of both types of reputation. On the one hand, papers such
as Coles and Hoi (2003) and Fich and Shivdasani (2007) nd that directors who demonstrate
shareholder-friendly behavior and monitor management are more likely to gain additional di-
rectorships. On the other hand, papers such as Helland (2006) and Marshall (2011) nd that
shareholder-friendly actions hurt directors chances of being invited to other boards. Zajac
and Westphal (1996), Eminet and Guedri (2010), and Bouwman (2011) nd evidence consis-
1See, for example, The Proxy Access Debate,New York Times, October 9, 2009.
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tent with the existence of conicting reputational concerns: rms controlled by shareholders
(managers) are more likely to invite directors who have demonstrated shareholder-friendliness
(management-friendliness) in their previous board positions.2
To study how these conicting reputational concerns a¤ect directorsbehavior and rm
value, we develop a model with three key components. First, being a board member allows a
director to a¤ect corporate governance in the rm and thereby change the allocation of control
between management and shareholders. Second, whether a director is shareholder-friendly or
management-friendly is the directors private information, and by allocating control to either
managers or shareholders, directors can a¤ect the markets perception of their shareholder-
friendliness. Third, the allocation of control in a given rm determines, among other things,
which type of directors it is looking for. In particular, rms that are controlled by shareholders
(management) have greater demand for shareholder-friendly (management-friendly) directors.
Therefore, the aggregate quality of corporate governance, the structure of boards, and the type
of reputation that is more valuable in the labor market are all determined in equilibrium.
We show that directorsreputational concerns lead to strategic complementarity of corpo-
rate governance across rms. In particular, stronger governance in one rm leads to stronger
governance in its peer rms, and vice versa.3 Intuitively, when most other rms have weak
corporate governance, the decision of whom to invite to the boards of these rms is controlled
by managers. Thus, to increase their chances of obtaining additional directorships, directors
have incentives to build a reputation for being management-friendly. This type of reputation
can be established by giving more control to the managers of their rms and not interfering
with their decisions, leading to weaker governance. Conversely, when most other rms have
strong corporate governance, directors will strengthen corporate governance of their rms to
build a reputation for being shareholder-friendly.
Our paper thus identies a novel channel of strategic complementarities between rms,
which work through directorsreputational concerns in the labor market. Strategic comple-
mentarities arise due to the dual role that directorsactions have on supply and demand in
the market for directors: in addition to a¤ecting directorsown reputation (supply), they also
2Section III provides a review of these and other relevant papers in the empirical literature. See also Adams,
Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) for a discussion of this reputational trade-o¤.
3In what follows, we use the term strong corporate governance to describe rms in which shareholders
have control, and weak corporate governanceto describe rms in which management has control.
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a¤ect which type of reputation is more valuable in the market (demand).4
Strategic complementarity of governance has two implications. First, due to strategic com-
plementarity, a small regulatory change, such as a marginal increase in the required percentage
of independent directors, can have a signicant e¤ect on the aggregate quality of governance.
Second, strategic complementarity implies that there can be multiple equilibria, characterized
by the aggregate quality of corporate governance. In particular, we show that when directors
reputational concerns are su¢ ciently important, an equilibrium in which aggregate governance
is strong and the labor market rewards directors for being shareholder-friendly coexists with
a weak governance equilibrium, in which a management-friendly reputation is more valuable.
In this respect, the strength of corporate governance is self-fullling, and hence countries and
industries with similar characteristics can have very di¤erent governance systems.
Our analysis demonstrates that the e¤ect of various corporate governance polices crucially
depends on the existing aggregate quality of corporate governance. Consider a policy that
strengthens directorsreputational concerns, such as increasing the maximum allowed number
of directorships a single individual can hold.5 We show that when directors become more
concerned about their reputation in the labor market, governance becomes even stronger in
systems with strong governance, where a shareholder-friendly reputation is more valuable.
However, in systems where managers are in control and directors are rewarded more for being
management-friendly, stronger reputational concerns weaken governance even further. In other
words, directors reputational concerns amplify the existing aggregate quality of corporate
governance. This result suggests that restrictions on the number of board seats a single director
can hold are more likely to be benecial in countries with weak governance systems.
Similarly, policies that indirectly a¤ect directorsreputational concerns can be a double-
edged sword, whose e¤ect depends on the existing governance system. In particular, we show
that increasing board size or improving boardroom transparency is likely to strengthen corpo-
4The existing literature on labor markets highlights other channels of strategic complementarities between
rms. In particular, prior work shows that strategic complementarities can arise when both workers and rms
make investment or entry decisions in the presence of search frictions (e.g., Acemoglu (1996), Laing, Palivos, and
Wang (1995)), or when there are increasing returns to scale in either the matching technology (e.g., Diamond
(1982)) or the production function (e.g., Benhabib and Farmer (1994)).
5Directorsreputational concerns can also be a¤ected by regulations that change the value of a given direc-
torship or that include term or age limits on directors. Note that restrictions on the number of directorships are
often introduced to allow directors to devote more time and attention to the rms on whose boards they serve.
We abstract from director busyness and highlight a novel e¤ect of restrictions on the number of directorships
that works through directorsreputational concerns.
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rate governance if aggregate governance is already strong, but is likely to weaken governance
further if aggregate governance is already weak. Thus, our study shows that due to external-
ities in the labor market for directors, board size a¤ects governance not only within but also
across rms, and that improved transparency may have adverse consequences.6
Finally, we show that due to directors reputational concerns, policies that strengthen
corporate governance may actually decrease shareholder welfare for two reasons. First, when
aggregate governance becomes stronger and hence a shareholder-friendly reputation becomes
more valuable, directors will allocate more control to shareholders in order to signal their
shareholder-friendliness, not because more shareholder control is actually optimal. This may
lead to ine¢ ciently high levels of shareholder control in cases in which allocating some control
to management is valuable due to management expertise or the importance of managerial
initiative. Second, strong governance can make a shareholder-friendly reputation so valuable
that even the most management-friendly directors take observable actions that help them
be perceived as shareholder-friendly. This makes it di¢ cult for shareholders to understand
directorsintrinsic characteristics and hence make informed director appointment decisions.7
Our paper is related to the literature on reputational concerns, where agents distort their
decisions to convince the market that their quality is high (e.g., Holmstrom (1999)). As in
our paper, reputational concerns in these models can lead to strategic interactions between
agents or between the agent and the market.8 In contrast to most of the existing literature,
our model features two conicting types of reputation shareholder-friendly and management-
friendly. In Bar-Isaac and Deb (2014) and Bouvard and Levy (2013), the agent also cares
about their reputation with two audiences (the two audiences in our setting are shareholders
and managers), but the unique feature of our model is that the actions a player takes to build
6One policy that has increased boardroom transparency is the 2004 Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) disclosure law, which requires companies to disclose if one of their directors leaves the board due to a
disagreement. Prior to the SEC ruling, disclosure was only required if the director leaving the rm requested
his resignation letter to be made public. The new ruling requires all such departures to be disclosed in the
rms 8-K ling within four business days after the event, even if the director did not provide any written
correspondence or request that the matter be made public. In China, a somewhat similar 2004 law requires
rms to disclose the names of those independent directors who vote in dissent (Jiang, Wan, and Zhao (2013)).
7We also show that an increase in the proportion of independent directors on the board, which is intended
to benet shareholders, may actually lead to a lower probability of shareholder control.
8For example, reputational concerns can create herding behavior (e.g., Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and
Zwiebel (1995)). Ordonez (2013) shows that reputational concerns in credit markets lead to strategic comple-
mentarities in risk-taking between borrowers.
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a certain type of reputation increase the value of this reputation for other players and, due to
strategic complementarities, the equilibrium market value of this reputation.9
In the context of directorsreputational concerns, our paper is related to Song and Thakor
(2006), Levit (2012), and Ruiz-Verdu and Singh (2014). While these papers focus on board-
management interactions within a single rm, we study how directorsreputational concerns
a¤ect all rms in the economy and emphasize externalities in corporate governance.
The literature points out that governance externalities can arise from competition for man-
agers (Acharya and Volpin (2010), Dicks (2012), and Acharya, Gabarro, and Volpin (2013)),
the takeover market (Burkart and Ra¤ (2014)), and the quality of reported earnings (Nielsen
(2006) and Cheng (2011)). Our paper identies a novel channel of governance externalities
that work through directorsreputational concerns. To our knowledge, this is the rst paper
to model the labor market for directors and its e¤ect on equilibrium board structures. In this
respect, our paper contributes to the literature that studies how the structure of the board
a¤ects board decisions.10
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I introduces the model setup. Section II presents the
analysis and includes a discussion of the comparative statics results, implications for welfare,
and several extensions. Section III o¤ers testable predictions and describes the related empirical
literature. Section IV concludes and discusses other potential applications of our framework.
All proofs are provided in the Appendix and supplemental results are given in the Internet
Appendix.11
I. Setup
There are two identical rms in the economy, and the board of each rm consists of K  2
directors.12 The game has two stages the allocation of control stage, followed by the director
labor market stage.
9See also Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005), Frenkel (2015), and Gertner, Gibbons, and Scharfstein (1988).
Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999) study a model of career concerns with multi-tasking and show that if
the agent has incentives to demonstrate high talent, and if talent and e¤ort are complements, multiple equilibria
can exist. Because their paper does not feature conicting types of reputation, the reason for multiplicity of
equilibria in their model is di¤erent from ours.
10See, for example, Adams and Ferreira (2007), Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2013), Harris and Raviv (2008),
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Levit (2012), Malenko (2014), and Warther (1998).
11The Internet Appendix may be found in the online version of this article on the Journal of Finance website.
12In Section II.C.4, we discuss an extension to a general number of rms.
6
In the rst stage, each director decides whether to vote for a proposal that transfers control
of the rm from the manager, who has control by default, to shareholders. For example,
the director can push for the separation of the CEO and board chairman positions, for a
higher proportion of independent directors on the board, or for board declassication. Other
shareholder-friendly actions include adopting majority voting for director elections, providing
proxy access to shareholders, and implementing nonbinding shareholder proposals.
The voting decisions are binary and are made simultaneously by all directors in both rms.
Let eik 2 f0; 1g be the voting decision of director k in rm i. If eik = 1, the director votes in
favor of the proposal to shift control to shareholders. If eik = 0, the director votes against the
proposal. Let i 2 f0; 1g be the variable that captures who has control of rm i after the vote,
where i = 1 stands for shareholder control, and i = 0 stands for management control. The
collective decision-making rule is as follows: if at least T 2 f1; :::; Kg directors of rm i vote
in favor of the proposal, then shareholders of rm i obtain control, otherwise management
retains control. In other words, i = 1 if and only if
PK
k=1 eik  T . For example, if K is
an odd number and T = K+1
2
, then the collective decision-making rule is a simple majority
requirement. We assume that individual votes are not observable, but the allocation of control
 =
 
i; j

is observable.13
We assume that directors di¤er in their shareholder-friendliness. A shareholder-friendly
director has a higher relative benet from shareholder control than a management-friendly
director. This heterogeneity could be due to di¤erent objectives or di¤erences in opinion. For
example, even if all directors aim to maximize shareholder value, they may disagree on whether
the best way to achieve this objective is by giving control to shareholders or the manager.14
In particular, the type of director k of rm i is ik, where ik is distributed according to a
continuous symmetric distribution function F () with mean E [], bounded density f (), and
full support on R.15 The direct utility of a director of type ik from the allocation of control
in rm i is v (i; ik), where v (1; ) and v (0; ) are nonnegative and continuously di¤erentiable.
13In Section II.C.3, we discuss an extension in which individual directorsvotes are observable as well.
14Giving control to the manager could enhance shareholder value because the success of the rm depends
on managerial initiative and rm-specic investments that the manager has incentives to take only if he has
control (e.g., Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990)), or because the manager has expertise
and private information that he will not communicate to the board unless he has control (e.g., Adams and
Ferreira (2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008)). In Section II.C.1, we build on this interpretation and discuss
the case in which the relative value from shareholder control can di¤er across rms.
15All the results hold for asymmetric distributions of types as well.
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We assume that v (1; ) is increasing in  and v (0; ) is decreasing in . Thus, high  stands for
shareholder-friendliness, and low  stands for management-friendliness. Types are independent
across directors, and the type of each director is the directors private information.16
It is useful to dene a directors relative benet from shareholder control as
()  v (1; )  v (0; ) . (1)
Given our assumptions on v (1; ) and v (0; ), it follows that @()
@
> 0. We make the fol-
lowing additional assumptions on (). First, we assume that lim!1() = 1 and
lim! 1() =  1. This assumption ensures that if a director is su¢ ciently shareholder-
friendly (management-friendly), his direct utility from shareholder (management) control is
su¢ ciently large and induces him to vote in favor of (against) shareholder control despite any
reputational concerns. This assumption is made for simplicity and does not a¤ect the main
results.17 Second, we assume E [ ()] = 0. This means that on average, directorsrelative
benet from shareholder control is zero.18 Finally, we assume that directors do not incur any
costs of voting against management. If such costs were present, directors would have weaker
incentives to vote for shareholder control, especially due to free-riding within the board. Since
our focus is on externalities between rms, we abstract from costly voting and free-riding, but
our main results would continue to hold in the setting with costly voting as well.
In the second stage, each rm can be hit by a shock, in which case exactly one of its
directors resigns and the rm has to appoint a new director. For example, directors may have
to resign due to health issues, family reasons, retirement, or because they have been appointed
to an executive position. The shocks are independent from the allocations of control i and
from directorstypes ik, and are independent across rms. The probability that the rm is hit
by a shock is  2 (0; 1), and each of K directors has an equal chance of being hit by the shock.
16It is not necessary for our results that ik be perfectly transferable across rms. Directors may adapt
their behavior and conform to the existing corporate governance system of the rms in which they serve as
board members. As long as there is some level of persistence in directors types, our results continue to
hold. Consistent with the assumption that ik is transferable across rms, Bouwman (2011) nds that a rms
governance practices move in the direction of governance practices of other rms in which its directors serve.
17If () is bounded, then in addition to the threshold equilibria described below, there exist pooling
equilibria in which all types follow the same strategy of voting in favor of (or against) shareholder control, but
the results do not change qualitatively.
18All results, except the analysis of director welfare in the Internet Appendix, hold for any value of E [ ()],
including innity. In the Internet Appendix, we discuss how the welfare analysis depends on the sign of E [ ()].
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Thus, for each director, the unconditional probability of resigning is 
K
. Directors get utility
from the allocation of control in their rm regardless of whether they resign. If a director
resigns from the board, he no longer participates in the labor market for directors and does
not get any direct utility from resignation. If a director does not resign, he can be appointed
to the board of the other rm if that rm was hit by a resignation shock and needs a new
director.
If a director resigns, his rm searches for a new director. The rm can hire any director
of its peer rm who did not resign, or an outside candidate who is not serving on any board.
We assume that the supply of outside candidates is unlimited and that outside candidates are
drawn from the same distribution F , so their expected type equals E [].
If a director is hired by another rm, he gets additional utility. Specically, if a director
from rm i joins the board of rm j, he gets  > 0. The parameter  can be thought of
as the strength of directorsreputational concerns.19 While directorsnancial compensation
might be a¤ected by the demand and supply of directors in the labor market, a large com-
ponent of directorsutility from board seats is nonpecuniary. Indeed, when asked about their
personal benets from serving on the board, directors list prestige, valuable connections, in-
tellectual stimulation, power, and the opportunity to develop new areas of expertise as being
more important than nancial compensation (see, for example, Lorsch and MacIver (1989)
and the PwCs 2013 Annual Corporate Directors Survey). Matveyev (2013) notes that all
outside directors within a rm usually get the same pay, and almost all within-rm variation
in compensation comes from the fees directors get from serving on special committees. For
these reasons, and for simplicity, we abstract from the e¤ects of the labor market on  and
take it as a given parameter. In the Internet Appendix, we endogenize  by assuming that the
controlling party can o¤er the new director a contract that is contingent on his actions after
he joins the rm.
Importantly, the allocation of control in the rm a¤ects who makes the new director ap-
pointment decision if one of the directors resigns. Specically, if the manager has control
(i = 0), then the manager makes the appointment decision, whereas if shareholders have
19We also assume that an outside candidate gets utility  if he joins the board of rm i or j, and utility
zero otherwise. This assumption implies that the aggregate utility of directors from the labor market does not
depend on whether the vacancies are lled with incumbent directors or outside candidates. All the results of
the paper continue to hold if these assumptions are relaxed. The only exception is Lemma IA.2 in the Internet
Appendix, which analyzes the aggregate utility of directors.
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control (i = 1), then shareholders make the appointment decision.
20 We assume, as de-
scribed in detail below, that shareholders have a preference for more shareholder-friendly di-
rectors and the manager has a preference for more management-friendly directors. Denote by
hi
 
i; j

2 f0; 1g the hiring decision of rm i based on the allocation of control in both rms,
given that one of the directors of rm i has resigned. Specically, if the rm hires an outside
candidate, then hi = 0, while if it hires one of the directors of rm j, then hi = 1. The hiring
decision of rm i depends on the allocation of control in rm j since the allocation of control
in a rm is informative about the shareholder-friendliness of its directors. In particular, let jk
denote the reputation of director k in rm j, dened as the expected type of the director at the
beginning of the second stage. Since directorsindividual votes are not observable, all directors
within a rm will have the same reputation in equilibrium. The reputation of directors in rm
j will be a function of the allocation of control j and will be endogenously determined by
the voting strategies ejk (jk), k = 1; :::; K. We denote by j
 
j

= E

jkjj

the equilibrium
expected type of directors in rm j given the allocation of control j. We assume that if
several directors of rm j have the same reputation and did not resign, they are equally likely
to be invited to rm i. We also assume that rms prefer hiring a director currently serving
on the other board over hiring an outside candidate whenever the two directors have the same
reputation.
Shareholders and managers derive direct utility from the allocation of control in their rm,
as well as utility from the composition of their board. We assume that shareholders prefer share-
holder control over management control and a shareholder-friendly board over a management-
friendly board and that management has the opposite preferences. We also assume that the
aggregate utility of shareholders and managers is higher under shareholder control and with
a more shareholder-friendly board, reecting the idea that management control can create
ine¢ ciencies. Specically, if after the second stage the prole of directorstypes in rm i is
(i1; :::; iK) and i  1K
PK
k=1 ik is the boards average type, then the utility of shareholders
20In practice, the extent to which shareholders have control over director elections depends on a number of
governance characteristics that vary across rms. First, it depends on how easy it is for shareholders to nominate
their own candidates, particularly on whether the board is staggered and whether the rm has granted proxy
access to large shareholders. Second, it depends on whether the rm uses majority or plurality voting for
director elections. Finally, it is a¤ected by the overall independence of the board: the more independent the
board is, the easier it is for directors to recommend candidates who are not supported by the manager.
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and managers is given by
uSH (i; i1; :::; iK) = vSH (i) + gSH
 
i

; (2)
uM (i; i1; :::; iK) = vM (i) + gM
 
i

;
respectively, where vSH (0) = vM (1) = 0, vSH (1)  vM (0) > 0, gSH is an increasing function,
gM is a decreasing function, and gSH + gM is an increasing function.21 For tractability, we
assume that gSH and gM are linear. All the results, except the analysis of welfare in Section
II.B, are derived for general increasing functions gSH and gM .
Note that we implicitly assume that the controlling party only cares about the new di-
rectors shareholder-friendliness and abstract from the e¤ect of other relevant factors, such as
directorsexperience and expertise. Our results continue to hold in a setting where the party
making the appointment decisions also cares about directorsexpertise, as long as expertise
and shareholder-friendliness are not perfectly correlated across directors. In addition, it is often
argued that given the boards dual role as both a monitor and advisor, even shareholders may
prefer to have some management-friendly directors on the board (e.g., Adams and Ferreira
(2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008)). We discuss this possibility in Section II.C.1.
Our solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE):
DEFINITION 1: A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a set of directors voting strategies
eik (ik), e

jk (jk), beliefs about directorstypes 

i (i), and rmshiring strategies h

i
 
i; j

such that the following conditions are satised:
(i) The voting decision of director k of rm i maximizes his expected utility, where beliefs
about directorstypes i (i), other directorsvoting strategies e

ik (ik), e

jk (jk), and rm js
hiring strategy hj
 
j; i

are taken as given.
(ii) The hiring decision of the controlling party of rm i maximizes its expected utility, where
beliefs j
 
j

and directorsvoting strategies eik (ik), e

jk (jk) are taken as given.
(iii) Whenever possible, beliefs about directors types are consistent with Bayes rule, where
directorsvoting strategies eik (ik), e

jk (jk) are taken as given.
We restrict attention to equilibria that survive small perturbations in the equilibrium strate-
21The assumption vSH (0) = vM (1) = 0 is just a normalization.
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gies of other directors at the same rm. Formally, we introduce a renement that is similar to
the trembling handrenement in normal form games (e.g., Kreps (1990)).
DEFINITION 2: Consider any equilibrium in pure strategies. The equilibrium is called trem-
bling hand perfect if for any sequence fng, n 2 (0; 1), limn!1 n = 1, for each rm i,
director k0, and type , there exists n0 <1 such that if
(i) all directors of rm i except k0 play their equilibrium strategy eik () with probability n
and make a mistake playing 1  eik () with probability 1  n, and
(ii) all directors of rm j 6= i play their equilibrium strategy ejk (),
then for any n > n0, given beliefs i (1) and 

i (0), the best response of director k0 of rm i
if his type is  is his equilibrium strategy eik0 ().
II. Analysis
Consider the set of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game that satisfy Denition 2. Con-
sider director k in rm i and his utility from having a reputation i. Firm j will search for a
new director with probability . In this case, if j = 1, that is, if shareholders of rm j have
control, then rm j will hire one of the directors of rm i if and only if their reputation is
above the reputation of the outside candidate E []. Indeed, since gSH is an increasing function
of the shareholder-friendliness of the board, shareholders will hire the director with the most
shareholder-friendly reputation. Similarly, if j = 0, that is, the manager of rm j retains
control, then rm j will hire one of the directors of rm i if and only if their reputation is
below the reputation of the outside candidate. In other words, hj
 
j; i

= 1 if and only if
j = 1 and i  E [], or j = 0 and i  E []. Because all directors of rm i are treated
symmetrically, conditional on rm j hiring one of the directors of rm i, director k will be
hired with probability 1
K
. Hence, if  j denotes the ex-ante probability that shareholders of
rm j obtain control, then the expected benet of the director from obtaining reputation i is
given by  
K
  (i;  j), where
  (i;  j) =  j  1 fi  E []g+ (1   j) 1 fi  E []g . (3)
Note that for any ;  such that  > E [] > ,   (; ) >   (; ) if and only if  > 0:5.
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Intuitively, whether a director wants to have a shareholder-friendly or a management-friendly
reputation depends on the allocation of control in other rms. If managers (shareholders) are
the main decision-makers in other rms, that is,  is small (large), then the director is more
likely to be invited to other boards if he is known for being management-friendly (shareholder-
friendly).
Let Uik (ik; i) be the expected utility of director k in rm i given his type ik and allocation
of control in his rm i, and taking as given beliefs i and the probability of shareholder control
in the other rm  j. Then Uik (ik; i) is given by
Uik (ik; i) = v (i; ik) + 

K
  (i (i) ;  j) . (4)
Using (4), the following lemma shows that in equilibrium, all directors within a rm follow the
same strategy and vote for the proposal if and only if their preference for shareholder control
is su¢ ciently strong.
LEMMA 1: In equilibrium, there exists a nite i such that eik () = 1 if and only if  > 

i .
Lemma 1 implies that all directors in a rm follow the same threshold voting strategy. The
threshold i a¤ects the likelihood that shareholders obtain control, which is given by
 (i ) =
KX
t=T
CKt (1  F (i ))
t F (i )
K t; (5)
where CKt =
K!
t!(K t)! is the Binomial coe¢ cient. In addition, the threshold 

i a¤ects the forma-
tion of directorsreputation. To capture this, we denote the reputation function in equilibrium
with a threshold i by i (i; 

i ). The proof of Lemma 2 derives the expressions for i (i; 

i )
and shows that directors whose rm is controlled by shareholders (managers) are perceived to
be more (less) shareholder-friendly than an outside candidate:
LEMMA 2: Consider any equilibrium characterized by a threshold i . Then
i (0; 

i ) < E [] < i (1; 

i ) : (6)
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Consider the best response function i(

j) of directors in rm i, taking as given that
directors in rm j vote for shareholder control when their type exceeds the threshold j . The
best response function denes the threshold i(

j) such that only types  > i(

j) vote for
shareholder control. From (4) and the proof of Lemma 1, it follows that i(

j) = (

j), where
 ()   1



K
(1  2 ())

(7)
and  1 () is the inverse of the function (). Because () is strictly increasing, continuous,
and takes all values on ( 1;+1), its inverse  1 () is a well dened, strictly increasing, and
continuous function. Since, as shown in the proof of Lemma 1,  () decreases with  and takes
all values between zero and one, the best response function  () increases in  and takes all
values in the interval
 
 1
 
  
K

; 1
 
 
K

.
Since the best response threshold of directors in rm i is increasing in the threshold of
directors in its peer rm j, the game exhibits strategic complementarity. Intuitively, if directors
of rm j are more likely to vote for the proposal (j decreases), then shareholders of rm j are
more likely to get control and have the power to appoint directors to their board. Therefore, the
relative reward of directors in rm i from building a shareholder-friendly reputation becomes
higher. This increases the incentives of directors in rm i to vote for shareholder control,
decreasing the threshold i .
The following lemma characterizes the set of equilibria using the properties of  () and the
symmetry of the best response functions.
LEMMA 3: An equilibrium always exists, and any equilibrium is symmetric.
Since all equilibria of the game are symmetric, that is, i = 
 for all i, any equilibrium
 is the solution of  () = . It also follows that the reputation functions i (; ) are
identical across rms. We denote this function by  (; ). Given (6) and the property of
  (; ) discussed above,   ( (1; ) ;  ()) >   ( (0; ) ;  ()) if and only if  () > 0:5. In
other words, a shareholder-friendly reputation generates a higher payo¤ than a management-
friendly reputation if and only if there is a greater than 50% chance that the other rm will
be controlled by shareholders. As we explain below, identifying which type of reputation is
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more valuable has important implications for the analysis. Motivated by this argument, the
following denition classies potential equilibria into two types.
DEFINITION 3: An equilibrium is called shareholder-friendly if  () > 0:5 and management-
friendly if  () < 0:5.
Due to strategic complementarity, our model can have multiple equilibria. Moreover, the
next proposition shows that when reputational concerns are su¢ ciently important, there always
exist at least one shareholder-friendly and at least one management-friendly equilibrium. Thus,
equilibria with strong and weak governance can coexist for a given set of parameters, suggesting
that countries or industries with similar characteristics can have di¤erent corporate governance
systems as an equilibrium outcome.
PROPOSITION 1: There exist  and , 0 <    <1, such that
(i) if  > , there exist at least one shareholder-friendly equilibrium and at least one
management-friendly equilibrium,
(ii) if  < , all equilibria are of the same type, in particular, all equilibria are management-
friendly if ( 1 (0:5)) < 0 and shareholder-friendly if ( 1 (0:5)) > 0, and
(iii) if  < , the equilibrium is unique.
The rationale behind the proposition is that strategic complementarity between rmscor-
porate governance systems arises due to directorsreputational concerns, represented by pa-
rameter . When  increases, reputation becomes more important for directors, and hence
strategic complementarity becomes stronger. Therefore, multiple equilibria are more likely to
exist when reputational concerns are signicant. Figure 1 illustrates this e¤ect by plotting the
best response function of directors for  = 0:2, K = 9, T = 5, a standard normal distribution
of types, and utility functions v (1; ) = e0:4 and v (0; ) = e 0:2 + e0:08   e0:02.
First, when  = 0, directors do not care about additional board seats and hence
make their voting decisions independent of the strategy of directors in the other rm. Hence,
the best response  () for  = 0 is a constant function with value  1 (0). Therefore, a
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Figure 1. Best response function. The gure presents directorsbest response function  () for
parameters  = 0:2, K = 9, T = 5, v (1; ) = e0:4, v (0; ) = e 0:2 + e0:08   e0:02, and a standard
normal distribution of types, where  is the probability that a rm is hit by a resignation shock, K
is the number of directors on the board, T is the voting rule, and v (; ) is the utility of a director
of type  from the allocation of control in his rm. Parameter  measures the strength of directors
reputational concerns.
unique equilibrium exists, and this equilibrium is management-friendly because ( 1 (0:5)) =
 (0) < 0, that is, the average type prefers management control to shareholder control. When
 becomes positive, strategic complementarity arises, and the best response function  ()
becomes strictly increasing. The solid line in Figure 1 represents  () for  = 5. Although
 () is increasing, externalities between rms are not strong enough. Hence, the game still
has a unique equilibrium, and this equilibrium is management-friendly ( around 0.16, which
corresponds to  () around 0.35). However, as Proposition 1 shows, as  increases further,
externalities between rms give rise to multiple equilibria, some of which are shareholder-
friendly. In particular, when  = 50 (the dashed line in Figure 1), the graph of the best
response function crosses the 45-degree line in three points, corresponding to three equilibria.
Two of them ( around -2.01 and -0.04) are shareholder-friendly, while the third one (
around 1.61) is management-friendly.
A. Comparative Statics
All equilibria of the game can be ranked by the aggregate quality of corporate governance,
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dened as the probability that shareholders get control,  (). Equilibria with a lower  are
more shareholder-friendly and feature stronger corporate governance. This section analyzes
the comparative statics of corporate governance.
Since the best response function  () is bounded and increasing, by Tarskis xed point
theorem,  () has the least and greatest xed points (equilibria). We denote these two equilibria
by  and , respectively, and refer to them as the most shareholder-friendlyand the least
shareholder-friendlyequilibria of the game.22 Given the potential multiplicity of equilibria,
we focus on the comparative statics in these extremal equilibria, as is common in games of
strategic complementarities (e.g., Vives (2005)).23
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose that  is either  or  and let     (). Then:
(i)   increases with  if and only if the equilibrium is shareholder-friendly.
(ii) If F2 () rst-order stochastically dominates F1 (), then  2   1.
(iii) Given K,   decreases with T .
(iv) Suppose   
K
is xed and consider a change in K :
(iv:a) Suppose T is xed. Then   increases with K.
(iv:b) Suppose T = K (unanimity rule). Then   decreases with K.
(iv:c) Suppose K is odd and T = K+1
2
(simple majority rule). Let K2 > K1 and suppose
that  >  (K1), where  (K) is dened by Proposition 1. Then  2   1 if and only
if the equilibrium is shareholder-friendly.
The rst statement of the proposition shows that stronger directorsreputational concerns
improve corporate governance only if the equilibrium is shareholder-friendly. This is because in
a management-friendly equilibrium, managers of other rms, rather than shareholders, make
the appointment decisions, and hence a shareholder-friendly reputation hurts directorschances
22The most shareholder-friendly equilibrium can be management-friendly if all equilibria of the game are
management-friendly, and vice versa.
23For the continuous parameter , we focus on local comparative statics, where the equilibrium continues to
exist upon a small change in the parameter.
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of being invited to other boards. In this sense, directorsreputational concerns amplify cor-
porate governance: as  increases, strong governance systems become stronger and weak gov-
ernance systems become weaker. This suggests that a regulation that increases the value of
reputation in the director labor market (e.g., increasing the allowed number of directorships a
person can hold) strengthens governance only if the existing governance system is su¢ ciently
strong.
According to the second statement of the proposition, if the population of directors be-
comes more shareholder-friendly (for example, due to a regulation that increases all directors
accountability to shareholders), the equilibrium probability of shareholder control increases.
Note also that a higher likelihood of shareholder-friendly directors leads to a higher probability
of shareholder control for two reasons. First, keeping directorsthreshold strategy  xed, it
is more likely that each individual directors type will be above the threshold. This e¤ect is
amplied by the decrease in directorsequilibrium threshold : knowing that the other rm is
now more likely to be controlled by shareholders, each director has stronger incentives to vote
for shareholder control and thereby build a shareholder-friendly reputation.
The intuition behind the third statement is straightforward: all else equal, a higher ma-
jority requirement reduces the probability that shareholders obtain control. Part (a) of the
fourth statement implies that if T is xed, a larger board size improves corporate governance.
Intuitively, with a larger board, it is easier to deviate from the status quo and transfer control
to shareholders. In contrast, part (b) shows that under the unanimity voting rule, a larger
board size leads to weaker governance. Indeed, with unanimity, shareholders obtain control
only if all directors vote for it. The larger the board, the more likely that at least one director is
su¢ ciently management-friendly and votes against shareholder control. Note that in all parts
of the fourth statement, we keep   
K
constant as we increase K, that is, we simultaneously
increase . This captures the idea that when the board is larger, it is more likely that at
least one of its directors will have to resign. If  remained constant as K increased, then all
else equal, each director would be less likely to be hired by the other rm simply because the
supply of directors would be larger. This e¤ect is similar to the e¤ect of a decrease in , which
we discuss in part (i) of the proposition. We therefore x 
K
to emphasize that K a¤ects the
equilibrium in a novel way, which is di¤erent from this supply e¤ect.
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In practice, boards generally make decisions based on a simple majority rule.24 Part (c)
of the fourth statement shows that under a simple majority rule, a larger board size improves
corporate governance if and only if the equilibrium is shareholder-friendly. Thus, increasing
board size amplies governance in the sense that weak governance systems become weaker and
strong governance systems become stronger as board size increases. Intuitively, under a simple
majority rule, the equilibrium is shareholder-friendly (management-friendly) if the probability
that each director votes for shareholder control is greater (smaller) than 0.5. An increase
in board size reduces the uncertainty about the outcome of the vote: as K increases, the
likelihood that at least half of the board will vote for shareholder control increases (decreases).
By making the outcome of the vote in the peer rm more predictable, a larger board size
e¤ectively amplies a directors reputational concerns and thus amplies corporate governance
by a similar rationale as before.
This intuition also implies that corporate governance is more likely to be self-fullling when
board size is larger. For example, if directors of rm i believe that each director of rm j is likely
to vote for shareholders ( is small), a large board size implies that rm j is very likely to be
controlled by shareholders, giving directors of rm i strong incentives to vote for shareholders
as well. Thus, when K is su¢ ciently large, beliefs that  is small become self-fullling.25 The
following lemma formalizes this intuition.
LEMMA 4: Suppose   
K
is xed and consider a simple majority rule. If both types of
equilibria (shareholder- and management-friendly) coexist for a given K, they also coexist for
any larger K. Moreover, if (E []) 6= 0, there exist 1 and 2, 0 < 1 < 2 <1, such that
(i) if   1, then only one type of equilibrium exists for any K  3,
(ii) if  2 (1; 2), then there exists K̂ > 3 such that both types of equilibria coexist if and
24For example, the Delaware General Corporation Law states The vote of the majority of the di-
rectors present at a meeting at which a quorum is present shall be the act of the board of direc-
tors unless the certicate of incorporation or the bylaws shall require a vote of a greater number. See
http://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/sc04/index.shtml.
25This argument also helps explain why part (iv.c) of Proposition 2 might not hold if  < : if  < , and
hence all equilibria are of the same type, the amplication e¤ect of K implies that an increase in K could give
rise to an additional equilibrium of a di¤erent type (similar to an increase in  in Proposition 1). Finally, it
is important to note that  >  is a su¢ cient, but not necessary, condition for (iv.c) to hold. For example,
(iv.c) also holds if  is su¢ ciently small and the equilibrium is unique both before and after a change in K.
Generally, (iv.c) holds whenever the type of the extremal equilibrium does not change with a change in K.
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only if K  K̂, and
(iii) if   2, then both types of equilibria coexist for any K  3.
We conclude the comparative statics analysis by noting that small changes in parameters
are amplied due to strategic complementarity of directorsvoting decisions. Consider, for
example, a decrease in the voting requirement T . The direct e¤ect of a decrease in T is that
if directorsstrategies are xed, control is more likely to be shifted to shareholders since the
proposal requires the approval of a smaller number of directors. In addition, realizing that the
peer rm is now more likely to be controlled by shareholders, directors have stronger incentives
to create a shareholder-friendly reputation. This second, indirect, e¤ect induces directors to
vote for shareholder control and magnies the direct e¤ect. This amplication e¤ect is standard
in games with strategic complementarities.26
B. Welfare
We next analyze the welfare implications of the model. We start by deriving players
expected utilities as a function of the equilibrium threshold  and then use it to compare
equilibria in terms of social welfare and Pareto e¢ ciency.
Consider the expected utility of shareholders and management of any rm i. It consists of
the utility from the allocation of control and the utility from the composition of the board. The
expected utility of shareholders from the allocation of control in their rm is  () vSH (1).
Similarly, the expected utility of management from the allocation of control in its rm is
(1   ())  vM (0). If c () denotes the expected composition (average type) of the board
after the labor market stage in equilibrium with a threshold , then, because gSH and gM are
linear, the total expected utility of shareholders of rm i is given by
WShareholders (
) =  () vSH (1) + gSH (c ()) ; (8)
and the total expected utility of management is given by
WManagement (
) = (1   ()) vM (0) + gM (c ()) ; (9)
26Formally, the proof of Proposition 2 shows that for a parameter p, @

@p = M (
)  @()@p j= , where
@()
@p j= captures the direct e¤ect of parameter p, and the multiplier M (
) = 1
1  @()@ j=
is greater than
one.
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where
c () = (1  )E [] +  () (1   ())

K   1
K
 (1; ) +
1
K
E []

+ ()2  (1; ) +  (1   ())  ()

K   1
K
 (0; ) +
1
K
E []

+ (1   ())2  (0; ) :
The rst term corresponds to the case in which there is no resignation shock in rm i, and
hence the expected average type is the prior regardless of the allocation of control. All other
terms relate to cases in which rm i is hit by a resignation shock. The second term corresponds
to the case in which shareholders get control in rm i but management retains control of rm
j. Since shareholders of rm i then hire the outside candidate with reputation E [] to replace
the resigning director, and since the reputation of the remaining directors of rm i is  (1; ),
the expected average type of the board conditional on this event is K 1
K
 (1; ) + 1
K
E []. The
third term corresponds to the case in which shareholders get control in both rms. Since
shareholders then hire a director of the other rm, whose reputation is  (1; ), and since
the reputation of the remaining directors is also  (1; ), the expected average type of the
board conditional on this event is  (1; ). The fourth and fth terms are derived similarly
and correspond to cases in which rm i is controlled by management while rm j is controlled
by shareholders and management, respectively. The next result describes several properties of
c ().
LEMMA 5: c () has the following properties:
(i) If  () 2

0; 1
2
; 1
	
, then c () = E [];
(ii) If  () 2
 
0; 1
2

, then c () < E [];
(iii) If  () 2
 
1
2
; 1

, then c () > E [].
Since gSH is increasing and gM is decreasing, Lemma 5, combined with (8) and (9), im-
plies that shareholders(managers) expected utility in any shareholder-friendly equilibrium
( () > 1
2
) is strictly higher (lower) than their expected utility in any management-friendly
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equilibrium ( () < 1
2
). However, it is generally not true that more shareholder-friendly
equilibria (with higher  ()) feature higher shareholder value and lower management value.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Consider the shareholders of rm i. The direct
e¤ect, which we call the control e¤ect, is that as  decreases and hence  () increases,
shareholders are more likely to get control. Thus, their utility increases both due to direct
benets of control and due to their control over the director appointment decisions, that is,
their ability to invite directors with a shareholder-friendly reputation after learning about their
type from their voting decisions. However, the indirect e¤ect is that when the equilibrium is
very shareholder-friendly ( is very low), directors of rm j vote for shareholder control almost
regardless of their types. As a result, shareholders of rm i learn very little about the type
of directors of rm j from these directorsdecision to give control to shareholders. Thus, the
privilege of controlling the composition of the board is o¤set by the inability to nd directors
who are intrinsically shareholder-friendly. For example, when  () ! f0; 1g, there is no
learning at all and hence no benet from controlling the composition of the board. We call
this novel e¤ect the learning e¤ect.27 It is important to note that shareholders always benet
from more shareholder control in their own rm (that is, from lower i ). The learning e¤ect
only applies to shareholdersutility from the allocation of control in the other rm, j : when
j is low, shareholders of rm i learn little about directors from rm j and may prefer a higher
j .
Lemma 5 implies that c () is nonmonotonic. Figure 2 presents the graph of c () for
 = 0:2, K = 9, T = 5, and a standard normal distribution of types. Generally, the sign of
@c()
@ determines whether the learning e¤ect dominates the control e¤ect. When
@c()
@ < 0, the
expected composition of the board becomes more shareholder-friendly as the equilibrium be-
comes more shareholder-friendly. In these cases, the learning e¤ect is always dominated by the
control e¤ect, and hence shareholdersexpected utility increases in the shareholder-friendliness
of the equilibrium. However, when @c(
)
@ > 0, a more shareholder-friendly equilibrium can
decrease shareholder welfare because the board becomes more management-friendly.
The presence of the learning e¤ect implies that policies that strengthen corporate gov-
27Note that c () = E [] in the case  () = 12 as well. However, here, the intuition is di¤erent: in contrast
to equilibria where  () ! f0; 1g, learning takes place when  () = 12 . Nevertheless, the expected type
of the board equals the prior because the increase in board shareholder-friendliness when shareholders have
control is exactly o¤set by the decrease in shareholder-friendliness when management has control.
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Figure 2. Board composition. The gure presents the average type of the board c () as a
function of the equilibrium threshold  for parameters  = 0:2, K = 9, T = 5, and a standard
normal distribution of types, where  is the probability that a rm is hit by a resignation shock, K is
the number of directors on the board, and T is the voting rule.  () is the equilibrium probability
of shareholder control in a given rm.
ernance in the economy may not always benet shareholders. For example, even though a
regulation that increases directorsaccountability to shareholders improves governance accord-
ing to the comparative statics in part (ii) of Proposition 2, it does not necessarily increase
shareholder welfare. Moreover, due to strategic complementarity, even a policy that only tar-
gets rm i by improving its corporate governance can nevertheless harm shareholders of rm
i. This is because such a policy spills over to other rms, making directors of other rms more
likely to give control to shareholders regardless of their type and thus making it di¢ cult for
shareholders of rm i to make informed director appointment decisions.
In the Internet Appendix, we derive the aggregate expected utility of directors and show
that it is nonmonotonic in . We also show that under certain conditions, directorsexpected
utility increases in the shareholder-friendliness of the equilibrium (decreases in ) if and only
if the equilibrium is shareholder-friendly.
B.1. Implications for Social Welfare and Pareto E¢ ciency
Due to the learning e¤ect and the nonmonotonicity of the expected utility of directors,
the e¤ect of  on the social welfare function that takes into account all players, including
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shareholders, managers, and directors, is generally ambiguous. Suppose, however, that the
social welfare function puts a su¢ ciently small weight on the welfare of directors, so that the
e¤ect of  on social welfare is determined by its e¤ect on the combined utility of shareholders
and management only. Then the assumptions vSH (1)  vM (0) and g0SH + g0M  0, together
with Lemma 5, imply that social welfare in any shareholder-friendly equilibrium is higher than
social welfare in any management-friendly equilibrium. Moreover, note that
@
@
[WShareholders (
) +WManagement (
)] =
@ ()
@
[vSH (1)  vM (0)] +
@c ()
@
[g0SH + g
0
M ] :
Therefore, if the learning e¤ect is dominated by the control e¤ect (@c(
)
@  0), then social
welfare locally increases with the shareholder-friendliness of the equilibrium.
While the analysis of social welfare is generally ambiguous, more can be said about Pareto
e¢ ciency.
LEMMA 6: (i) No shareholder-friendly equilibrium is Pareto dominated by a management-
friendly equilibrium, and vice versa.
(ii) If vSH(1)
g0SH
= vM (0) g0M
, then every equilibrium is Pareto e¢ cient.
In particular, the second statement of the lemma implies that all equilibria are Pareto
e¢ cient if there are no e¢ ciency losses from management control and from a management-
friendly board, that is, if vSH (1) = vM (0) and g0SH + g
0
M = 0.
C. Extensions
In this section, we discuss several extensions of the basic model. The formal setups, results,
and proofs for these extensions are provided in the Internet Appendix.
C.1. Value of Shareholder Control
If managers have high expertise or if they need to be given incentives to make rm-specic
investments, shareholders may be better o¤ delegating control to them.28 We analyze an
extension in which the optimal allocation of control varies across rms and show that the
28For example, see Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), Adams and Ferreira (2007), and
Harris and Raviv (2008).
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extended model exhibits strategic complementarity as well. Moreover, directorsreputational
concerns may now give rise to excessive shareholder control: if a shareholder-friendly reputa-
tion is rewarded in the labor market, directors may allocate control to shareholders to signal
their shareholder-friendliness even though management control is optimal. This new type of
ine¢ ciency suggests that regulators and exchanges should exercise caution in imposing cor-
porate governance requirements. Suppose, for example, that a new listing standard increased
the minimum percentage of independent directors on the board to 75%, which would result in
the optimal level of shareholder control if directors had no reputational concerns. However,
realizing that other rms are now more likely to be controlled by shareholders, directors would
have stronger incentives to transfer control to shareholders in their own rms to signal their
shareholder-friendliness. As a result, the regulation could shift the equilibrium to even higher
levels of board independence and an excessively high level of shareholder control.
C.2. Board Independence
To formally study the e¤ect of board independence, we consider an extension where some
directors are insiders and always vote for management control. If the strategies of independent
directors were not a¤ected by board structure, a higher number of insiders would increase the
likelihood of management control. Interestingly, however, if insiders participate in the labor
market for directors, then independent directors can be more likely to vote for shareholders in
the presence of insiders. Intuitively, an increase in the number of insiders decreases the supply of
incumbent shareholder-friendly directors and increases the supply of incumbent management-
friendly directors, which increases the relative value of a shareholder-friendly reputation due
to competition for board seats. In the Internet Appendix, we show that the overall e¤ect can
be such that the presence of insiders leads to a higher probability of shareholder control.
C.3. Boardroom Transparency
While the boards decision-making process is generally opaque, recent regulations have
increased boardroom transparency, making the behavior of individual directors more visible
(see footnote 6). To capture this, we analyze an extension in which directors individual
votes are observed. We show that transparency makes the most (least) shareholder-friendly
equilibrium more (less) shareholder-friendly and thereby amplies corporate governance. This
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result is similar in spirit to part (i) of Proposition 2, which shows that directorsreputational
concerns amplify governance. Intuitively, this is because transparency strengthens the link
between a directors individual vote and his reputation. If aggregate governance is weak and a
management-friendly reputation is more valuable, directors may be more reluctant to oppose
management when they know that their actions will be observed. Thus, increasing boardroom
transparency with the goal of strengthening a weak governance system is likely to achieve the
opposite outcome.
Similar to the basic model, the extended model features strategic complementarities be-
tween directors decisions across rms. However, transparency also gives rise to strategic
substitutability between directorsdecisions within rms. The reason is that directors within
a rm compete for the board seat at the other rm and hence can benet from di¤erentiat-
ing their reputation from each other. It follows that the labor market for directors creates
incentives for nonconformity within the boardroom.
C.4. Multiple Firms
We extend the model to N  2 rms and show that our main results continue to hold.
Importantly, based on the allocation of control across rms after the rst stage, the mar-
ket is divided into two sets: rms controlled by shareholders search among directors with a
shareholder-friendly reputation, and rms controlled by managers search among directors with
a management-friendly reputation. Thus, there is governance-related segmentation in the labor
market for directors. As the number of rms becomes innitely large, the externalities due to
reputational e¤ects disappear. However, given that the labor market for directors is segmented
both by industry and by geographical location (see the discussion in Section III), we think of
N as representing the number of rms in the relevant segment and hence not being very large.
III. Empirical Predictions
In this section, we discuss our paper in the context of the existing empirical literature and
o¤er new testable predictions. We are not aware of other theories that have these predictions.
The premise of our paper is that directors trade o¤ two conicting types of reputation, one
for being shareholder-friendly and one for being management-friendly. Consistent with such a
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trade-o¤, the literature nds mixed results with respect to whether the labor market rewards
directors for imposing discipline on management. In line with the view that a shareholder-
friendly reputation is rewarded, several papers nd that directors are held accountable for
failing to monitor management.29 Conversely, in line with the view that a management-friendly
reputation is rewarded, Helland (2006) nds that directors of rms charged with fraud observe
an increase in the number of outside directorships, and Marshall (2011) shows that directors
who resign from the board over a disagreement experience a loss in board seats over the ve-
year period following the dispute.30 Our paper also emphasizes that the aggregate quality
of corporate governance is the primary determinant of which type of reputation is rewarded
more in the labor market. Consistent with this idea, Lel and Miller (2015) nd that the labor
market consequences of shocks to directorsinternational reputation are stronger in countries
with strong investor protection.
Most of the existing literature looks at the aggregate number of board seats gained by di-
rectors. In contrast, our paper emphasizes that whether directorsshareholder-friendly actions
will be rewarded by invitations to boards of other rms depends crucially on the balance of
power at these rms. Formally, the rst implication is the following.
PREDICTION 1: Directors who demonstrate shareholder-friendliness are more (less) likely to
be subsequently appointed to boards of rms with stronger (weaker) corporate governance.
Shareholder-friendly directors can be identied as those who vote against management
(Jiang, Wan, and Zhao (2013)) or who leave the board due to a disagreement (Marshall (2011)).
Alternatively, one can look at rms where a director holds a board seat and measure observable
changes in these rms corporate governance during the directors tenure (e.g., removal of
antitakeover defenses or CEO-chairman separation). Zajac and Westphal (1996), Eminet and
Guedri (2010), and Bouwman (2011) nd evidence consistent with Prediction 1. For example,
Zajac and Westphal (1996) show that directors on boards that have recently increased the
ratio of outside directors, separated the CEO and chairman positions, or decreased executive
29Coles and Hoi (2003) show that directors who rejected the Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310 antitakeover
provisions were three times as likely to gain additional directorships than those who retained the provisions.
Fich and Shivdasani (2007) nd that following a nancial fraud lawsuit, directors are likely to lose board seats
at other rms, particularly those with strong governance. See also Harford (2003), Yermack (2004), Srinivasan
(2005), Ertimur, Ferri, and Stubben (2010), Jiang, Wan, and Zhao (2013), and Fos and Tsoutsoura (2014).
30Similarly, Ertimur, Ferri, and Maber (2012) nd no evidence that directors of rms involved in option
backdating incur reputational penalties at other rms.
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compensation have fewer subsequent appointments to rms with low board control but more
appointments to rms with high board control.31
Our paper also emphasizes the existence of corporate governance externalities between
rms. While governance externalities can arise for several reasons, the unique feature of our
model is that externalities are due to directorsreputational concerns in the labor market. Thus,
another empirical implication, which helps distinguish our mechanism from other potential
mechanisms, is the following.
PREDICTION 2: A positive exogenous shock to corporate governance of one rm improves
corporate governance of other rms, and this spillover e¤ect is greater for rms whose directors
have stronger reputational concerns.
Since governance externalities arise through the labor market for directors, they are likely
to be stronger across rms in the same segment of the labor market, such as rms in the same
geographic area and rms in the same industry. Indeed, the market for directors is somewhat
segmented both by geographic location (e.g., Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis (2013)) and by
industry, since rms look for candidates with relevant expertise and industry knowledge (e.g.,
Dass et al. (2014)). Thus, the empirical predictions of this section are likely to be stronger if
a rms peer group is dened as rms in related industries or in close geographic proximity. In
this sense, Prediction 2 is consistent with Albuquerque et al. (2014), who show that following a
cross-border acquisition, the local industry rivals of the target rm experience improvements in
corporate governance. In addition, as the results of Section II.C.4 demonstrate, the externalities
between rms become weaker as the number of rms increases. Hence, the empirical predictions
of this section should be the strongest when the relative segment of the market is relatively
small, for example, if the rms industry is concentrated.
Our analysis has implications for the transparency of board decision-making. In 2004,
the SEC adopted a law requiring rms to publicly disclose if one of their directors leaves
the board due to a disagreement. A similar 2004 law in China requires rms to disclose
if one of their independent directors votes in dissent. Section II.C.3 shows that increasing
31Bouwman (2011) shows that a rm is more likely to invite an individual to be its director if this individual
is a director at rms whose governance practices are similar to the rms existing governance practices. In the
context of French rms, Eminet and Guedri (2010) nd that directors who implement governance reforms that
increase (decrease) control over management are more likely to be appointed to boards with (without) nomi-
nating committees and boards with nominating committees dominated by non-executive (executive) directors.
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transparency amplies corporate governance: strong governance systems become stronger and
weak governance systems become weaker. This leads to the following prediction.
PREDICTION 3: Greater boardroom transparency strengthens (weakens) the rms corporate
governance if corporate governance of other rms is strong (weak).
The model also has implications for policies limiting the number of board seats a single
director can hold. Although U.S. laws do not restrict the number of directorships, U.S. rms
have been adopting such restrictions voluntarily.32 According to the 2012 Spencer Stuart Board
Index, 74% of S&P 500 rms now limit the number of directorships for their board members,
compared to only 27% in 2006. Since restricting the number of directorships decreases directors
reputational concerns, part (i) of Proposition 2 leads to the following prediction.
PREDICTION 4: A restriction on the number of directorships that each of the rms directors
can hold strengthens (weakens) the rms corporate governance if corporate governance of other
rms is weak (strong).
In addition to the maximum allowed number of directorships, directorsreputational con-
cerns can be a¤ected by factors such as age and tenure. While several papers (e.g., Marshall
(2011) and Jiang, Wan, and Zhao (2013)) study the e¤ect of directorsage and tenure on the
likelihood that they take shareholder-friendly actions, these papers do not look at the interac-
tion between directorsreputational concerns and other rmsgovernance practices. Our paper
emphasizes that directors with stronger reputational concerns will be more likely to act in a
shareholder-friendly manner only if corporate governance of peer rms is strong.
Finally, the comparative statics with respect to board size in part (iv.c) of Proposition 2
leads to the following prediction.33
PREDICTION 5: An increase in board size strengthens (weakens) the rms corporate gover-
nance if corporate governance of other rms is strong (weak).
32Many European and Asian countries impose a limit on the number of board seats a single direc-
tor can hold. This limit varies across di¤erent countries. See ECGI corporate governance codes at
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php and the White Paper on Corporate Governance in Asia (OECD
2003).
33Proposition 2, part (iv.c) is based on the assumption that the board makes decisions using a simple majority
rule. As discussed in Section II.A, this assumption is consistent with observed board practices.
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Empirically, a larger board size is associated with several characteristics of weak corporate
governance. For example, Yermack (1996) nds that small boards are more likely to have a
non-CEO chairman and a greater level of director stock ownership, and are more likely to
receive performance-based director fees, and Fahlenbrach (2009) shows that rms with large
boards have weaker shareholder rights, higher levels of CEO compensation, and lower pay-for-
performance sensitivity of CEO compensation. The evidence is mixed because these papers
also nd that larger boards have a higher percentage of independent directors. With this
caveat, if one interprets existing evidence as showing a negative relation between board size
and governance, Proposition 2, part (iv.c) and Prediction 5 suggest that the U.S. economy is in a
management-friendly equilibrium. Under this assumption, given Proposition 2 and Predictions
3 and 4, we would expect increased boardroom transparency to weaken corporate governance,
and restrictions on the number of directorships to strengthen corporate governance.
Predictions 3 to 5 refer to exogenous changes in governance characteristics such as trans-
parency or board size, for example, due to a new regulation. In this case, these characteristics
could change in a way that decreases shareholder value in a given rm. If, however, sharehold-
ers have to approve the adoption of new governance practices, then such changes will only be
made if they increase shareholder value. Under this assumption and assuming that stronger
governance increases shareholder welfare, our model predicts that a company will only limit
the number of directorships its directors can hold and will only decrease transparency and
board size if its peer rms have weak corporate governance.
Note also that the key to the above predictions is the existence of two conicting types
of reputation and the idea that corporate governance at peer rms determines which type of
reputation is more valuable. Thus, qualitatively, these predictions do not rely on strategic
complementarity of directorsvoting decisions. However, due to strategic complementarity,
the above e¤ects are signicantly amplied.34
34For example, relaxing the restriction on the number of directorships for rm As directors improves corporate
governance of rm A if governance of its peer rms is strong, even if governance at these rms is not a¤ected
by the change. However, the strategic complementarity e¤ect implies that improved governance in rm A will,
in turn, increase the market value of a shareholder-friendly reputation and thus improve governance at peer
rms as well, amplifying the initial e¤ect.
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IV. Conclusion
This paper develops a model of the labor market for directors and studies how directors
reputational concerns a¤ect corporate governance, the structure of the board, and shareholder
value. Whether directors would like to build a reputation for being shareholder-friendly or
management-friendly is determined in equilibrium and depends on the allocation of control
between shareholders and managers in other rms. In particular, the labor market only rewards
directors for being shareholder-friendly if corporate governance in most rms is strong.
We show that directors reputational concerns create corporate governance externalities
between rms. Stronger governance in one rm leads to stronger governance in other rms
and vice versa, and this spillover e¤ect is stronger when directorsconcerns about reputation
are stronger. As a result, an equilibrium with strong aggregate governance can coexist with
an equilibrium with weak aggregate governance, suggesting that countries and industries with
similar characteristics can have di¤erent governance systems. We also show that when directors
reputation in the labor market becomes more important for them, strong governance systems
become stronger but weak systems become even weaker. This implies that the e¤ect of certain
regulations, such as restricting the number of board seats an individual can hold or increasing
transparency of board decision-making, crucially depends on the existing state of corporate
governance. Our analysis provides new empirical predictions about director appointments and
peer e¤ects in corporate governance.
While the focus of our paper is on the labor market for corporate directors, our framework
can be applied to other settings in which an agents decisions a¤ect both his own reputation
and the type of reputation that is valued at his workplace. Examples include the CEOs choice
of corporate culture (e.g., the level of employee friendliness), an employees adoption of a new
technology, or an academics choice of research agenda.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Director k in rm i maximizes (4) taking eik (ik), ejk (jk), and i (i) as given.
By voting for the proposal, the director will only change the allocation of control in his rm (will
only be pivotal) if exactly T   1 other directors vote for the proposal. First, suppose that a director
is pivotal with a positive probability. Conditional on being pivotal, the directors relative utility from
voting for the proposal relative to voting against the proposal is
v (1; ik)  v (0; ik) +

K
[  (i (1) ;  j)    (i (0) ;  j)] : (A1)
When the director is not pivotal, his vote does not change his utility, and hence the directors relative
utility of voting for the proposal conditional on not being pivotal is zero. Hence, the director votes
for the proposal if and only if
(ik) >

K
[  (i (0) ;  j)    (i (1) ;  j)] , (A2)
where
  (i (0) ;  j)    (i (1) ;  j) =  j  (1 fi (0)  E []g   1 fi (1)  E []g)
+ (1   j)  (1 fi (0)  E []g   1 fi (1)  E []g) ,
which is independent of ik. Since lim!1() = 1, lim! 1() =  1, and @()@ > 0, there
exists a unique i such that the director votes for the proposal if and only if ik > 

i . Thus, all
directors within the rm follow the same threshold strategy.
It follows that j = (

j ), where  () =
PK
t=T C
K
t (1  F (i ))
t F (i )
K t, and CKt =
K!
t!(K t)!
is the binomial coe¢ cient. Note that  () decreases with . Indeed, let BK;p (x) be the cumula-
tive density function of a binomial distribution with parameters (K; p). Then, by the properties
of the binomial distribution, BK;p (x) is rst-order stochastically increasing as p increases, that is,
BK;p2 (x) < BK;p1 (x) for p2 > p1. Note that  () = 1 BK;1 F () (T   1). Since F () increases with
,  () decreases with .
In the Internet Appendix, we analyze the case in which some directors are never pivotal. We show
that no such equilibrium survives the trembling hand renement, and the only trembling hand perfect
equilibria are those in which each director k in each rm i plays a threshold strategy and votes for
the proposal if and only if ik  i for some nite i .
Proof of Lemma 2: Note that i (i; 

i ) is given by
i (i; 

i ) =
8><>:
PK
t=T C
K
t (1 F (i ))
tF (i )
K t( tK E[j>

i ]+
K t
K
E[ji ])PK
t=T C
K
t (1 F (i ))
tF (i )
K t if i = 1PT 1
t=0 C
K
t (1 F (i ))
tF (i )
K t( tK E[j>

i ]+
K t
K
E[ji ])PT 1
t=0 C
K
t (1 F (i ))
tF (i )
K t if i = 0:
(A3)
Hence, i (1; i ) and i (0; 

i ) satisfy
 (i )i (1; 

i ) + (1   (i ))i (0; i ) = E [] ; (A4)
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where () is given by (5). Since i (1; i ) and i (0; 

i ) are weighted averages of terms where the
smallest term in i (1; i ) is strictly higher than the largest term in i (0; 

i ), (6) must hold.
Proof of Lemma 3: A symmetric equilibrium exists if the equation  () =  has a solution. Since
 () is bounded and continuous, by the intermediate value theorem, a solution (not necessarily unique)
always exists. To prove that all equilibria are symmetric, recall from the proof of Lemma 1 that all
directors within a given rm i follow the same strategy with some threshold i . Hence, it only remains
to prove the symmetry of strategies across rms, that is, that i = 

j . Suppose that there exists some
asymmetric equilibrium in which i > 

j . In equilibrium, 

i = (

j ) and 

j =  (

i ). Therefore,
(j ) >  (

i ). Since  is strictly increasing, this inequality implies 

j > 

i , which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 1: Let  (; ) denote the best response function for a given value of parameter
. Since  () decreases in , lim! 1  () = 1, and lim!+1  () = 0, then for any given T;K there
exists  such that  () = 0:5. Then  (; ) =  1 (0) for any , and  () > 0:5 ,  < . We
prove parts (i) and (ii) here and relegate the proof of part (iii) to the Internet Appendix. Consider
part (i). To prove that both a management-friendly and a shareholder-friendly equilibrium exist
for a given , we need to prove that the function 	(; )   (; )    has at least one root on
(;+1) and at least one root on ( 1; ), where  (; ) is given by (7). Since  (; ) is bounded
on  2 ( 1;+1), then lim! 1	(; ) = +1 and lim!+1	(; ) =  1. Hence, by the
intermediate value theorem, both types of equilibria exist if there exist 1 <  and 2 >  such that
	(1; ) < 0 < 	(2; ). We next show that this condition is satised for a large enough . Fix
any 1 <  and 2 > . By (7), 	(1; ) decreases in  and 	(2; ) increases in . Moreover,
lim!1	(1; ) =  1 and lim!1	(2; ) = +1. Hence, there exists ̂ such that for any   ̂,
	(1; ) < 0 < 	(2; ). Therefore, for any   ̂ there exists at least one shareholder-friendly
and at least one management-friendly equilibrium. Consider the set A = f̂  0 : for any   ̂,
there exists at least one shareholder-friendly and at least one management-friendly equilibriumg. The
above arguments prove that this set is nonempty. It follows that  in the statement of the proposition
is dened as inffAg.
Consider part (ii). First, we prove that for any 0 < , all equilibria must be of the same type.
Suppose, on the contrary, that both types of equilibria exist for some 0 < , that is, there exist
1 <  and 2 >  such that 	(i; 0) = 0. We show that in this case, both types of equilibria
exist for any  > 0 as well, which contradicts the denition of  as inffAg. Indeed, for any
 > 0, 	(1; ) < 	(1; 0) = 0 and 	(2; ) > 	(2; 0) = 0. Since lim! 1	(; ) = +1
and lim!+1	(; ) =  1, then by the intermediate value theorem, there exist 01 2 ( 1; 1)
and 02 2 (2;+1) such that 	
 
0i; 

= 0. These are the shareholder-friendly and management-
friendly equilibria for  > 0. Next, suppose  1 (0)    > (<) 0. Consider any 0 < . Since
	(; 0) = 
 1 (0)    > (<) 0 and lim!+1	(; 0) =  1 (lim! 1	(; 0) = +1), there
exists ̂ > (<) such that 	

̂; 0

= 0, that is, there exists at least one management-friendly
(shareholder-friendly) equilibrium. Since, as shown above, all equilibria are of the same type, it
follows that all equilibria must be management-friendly (shareholder-friendly).
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider any parameter p. Let  (; p) denote the best response function for
a given value of this parameter, and  (p) and  (p) denote the greatest and least xed points of
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 (; p), respectively. In the Internet Appendix, we show that  (p) and  (p) exist, and that  (p) =
sup S (p), where S (p) = f :  (; p)  g, and  (p) = inf S (p), where S (p) = f :  (; p)  g.
Consider part (i). In the Internet Appendix, we show that if  2 f; g, then @(;)@ j= < 1.
Using the implicit function theorem for the equality  (; )    = 0, we get @@ =
@(;)
@
j=
1  @(;)
@
j=
.
Since @(;)@ j= < 1, it follows that sgn

@
@

= sgn

@(;)
@ j=

. Therefore, since  1 () is a
strictly increasing function, @

@ > 0,
@(;)
@ > 0,  (
) < 0:5. Since  () is a decreasing function,
we have @(
)
@ > 0,
@
@ < 0,  (
) > 0:5.
Next, in the Internet Appendix, we also show that for any parameter p, if  (; p) increases with
p, then  (p) and  (p) increase with p as well. We now use this result to prove statements (ii), (iii),
(iv.a), and (iv.b). Consider part (ii). Let BK;p (x) be the cumulative density function of a binomial
distribution with parameters (K; p). Then, by the properties of the binomial distribution, BK;p (x)
is rst-order stochastically increasing as p increases, that is, BK;p2 (x) < BK;p1 (x) for p2 > p1.
Let parameter  parameterize distribution F , such that F (2; ) rst-order stochastically dominates
F (1; ) for 2 > 1. Then, for any , as  increases, 1  F () increases and BK;1 F () () decreases.
Since  () = 1 BK;1 F () (T   1),  () increases with  for any , and hence  (; ) decreases with
. By the result above, this implies that  decreases with  as well. Thus,  () increases with  for
two reasons: rst, because  decreases with , and second, because  () increases with  for any given
. The implicit assumption in this analysis is that the distribution of outside candidates changes with
 as well, so that the expectations of the two distributions remain equal. Consider part (iii). Since
 () = 1   BK;1 F () (T   1), the function  () decreases with T by the properties of the binomial
distribution. Since  () =  1
 

K (1  2 ())

, the function  () increases with T . Thus, by the
result above,  increases with T , and hence  () decreases with T , both because 1 F () decreases
and because  () decreases with T for any . Consider part (iv.a). Note that BK2;p (x) < BK1;p (x)
for K2 > K1. Hence,  () increases with K, and thus  () =  1 ( (1  2 ())) decreases with
K for a xed T . By the result above, this implies that  decreases with K. Hence,  () =
1 BK;1 F () (T   1) increases with K, both because 1 F () increases and because  () increases
with K for any . Consider part (iv.b). If T = K, then  () = (1  F ())K , which decreases with
K for any . Hence,  () increases with K. By the result above, this implies that  increases with
K. Hence,  () = (1  F ())Kdecreases with K, both because 1   F () decreases and because
(1  F ())K decreases with K for any .
Finally, consider part (iv.c). Consider K1 and K2, K1 < K2, and suppose that  >  (K1), where
 (K1) is given by Proposition 1 whenK = K1. Since  >  (K1), both types of equilibria coexist, and
hence the equilibrium characterized by  (K1) is shareholder-friendly, which implies  ( (K1)) > 0:5
and F ( (K1)) < 0:5, and the equilibrium characterized by 

(K1) is management-friendly, which
implies 
 


(K1)

< 0:5 and F
 


(K1)

> 0:5. First, consider  (K). Note that  (;K) =
g(1   F () ;K), where g(p;K) =
PK
t=K+1
2
CKt p
t (1  p)K t. Since 1   F ( (K1)) > 0:5, then,
according to Lemma IA.1 in the Internet Appendix, g(1 F ( (K1)) ;K2) > g(1 F ( (K1)) ;K1),
and hence  ( (K1) ;K2) >  ( (K1) ;K1). Since  (;K) =  1 ( (1  2 (;K))), it follows that
 ( (K1) ;K2) <  (
 (K1) ;K1). Therefore,  ( (K1) ;K2)  (K1) <  ( (K1) ;K1)  (K1) =
0. Hence,  (K1) 2 S (K2), and since  (K2) = inf S (K2), we have  (K2)   (K1). Thus,
the most shareholder-friendly equilibrium does indeed become even more shareholder-friendly as K
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increases. Next, consider  (K). Since 1   F
 


(K1)

< 0:5, then, according to Lemma IA.1,
g(1   F
 


(K1)

;K2) < g(1   F
 


(K1)

;K1). Hence, 
 


(K1) ;K2

< 
 


(K1) ;K1

j, and
thus 
 


(K1) ;K2

> 
 


(K1) ;K1

. Therefore, 
 


(K1) ;K2

   (K1) > 
 


(K1) ;K1

 


(K1) = 0. Hence, 

(K1) 2 S (K2), and since  (K2) = sup S (K2), we have  (K1)   (K2).
Thus, the least shareholder-friendly equilibrium does indeed become even less shareholder-friendly as
K increases.
Proof of Lemma 4: The rst statement of the lemma follows from the proof of Proposition 2, part
(iv.c). That proof shows that if  (K) is management-friendly and  (K) is shareholder-friendly
(which is always the case if both types of equilibria coexist), then  (K) increases and  (K) decreases
as K increases, and hence both types of equilibria continue to exist.
Consider the second statement, that is, suppose (E []) 6= 0. Dene
1 
1

max f () ;()g
2   (3) ;
where  (K) < 1 is the cuto¤  dened in Proposition 1 when board size is K, and  satises
 (;K) = 12 . An equilibrium is shareholder-friendly if and only if 
 < . Note that under a simple
majority rule,  (;K) > 12 , F (
) < 12 , and hence  = F
 1  1
2

for all K. In particular, for a
symmetric distribution,  = E [], and hence 1 > 0.
Consider part (iii). In the Internet Appendix, we prove that if () 6= 0, then  2 A, where
A = f̂  0 : for any   ̂, there exists at least one shareholder-friendly and at least one
management-friendly equilibriumg. Thus, if () 6= 0, both types of equilibria exist for    (3)
when K = 3. Hence, based on the rst statement of the lemma, both types of equilibria exist
for    (3) and any K > 3, as required. Consider part (i). Since  (;K) 2 (0; 1), it fol-
lows that  (;K) 2
 
 1 ( ) ; 1 ()

for any  and K  3. Since any equilibrium  is
a solution to  (;K) = , any equilibrium satises  2
 
 1 ( ) ; 1 ()

. Note that
  1 ,  62
 
 1 ( ) ; 1 ()

. If    1 ( ), then any equilibrium satises  > ,
that is, is management-friendly. Similarly, if    1 (), then any equilibrium satises  < ,
that is, is shareholder-friendly, which completes the proof of part (i). Note also that parts (i) and (iii)
together imply that 1 < 2. Finally, part (ii) is proved in the Internet Appendix.
Proof of Lemma 5: Using (A4), we can rewrite the expression for c () as c () = E [] +  () ;
where
 () = (2 ()  1)  ()  (1; 
)  E []
K
:
Consider part (i). If  () = 12 , then it follows directly from the expression of  (
) that  () = 0.
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The case  () = 1 requires  !  1. Note that
lim! 1  (
) ( (1; )  E [])
= lim! 1
PK
t=T C
K
t (1  F ())
t F ()K t
 
t
KE [j > 
] + K tK E [j < 
]  E []

= lim! 1
PK
t=T C
K
t (1  F ())
t F ()K t tKE [j > 
]
  lim! 1
PK
t=T C
K
t (1  F ())
t F ()K t E []
+ lim! 1
PK
t=T C
K
t (1  F ())
t F ()K t K tK E [j < 
] :
Since lim! 1 F (
) = 0 and lim! 1 E [j > ] = E [], both the rst and second terms equal
E [] and hence cancel out. The third term can be rewritten as
lim
! 1
(F ()E [j < ]) lim
! 1
1
F ()
KX
t=T
CKt F (
)K t
K   t
K
= lim
! 1
Z 
 1
xdF (x) lim
! 1
K 1X
t=T
CKt F (
)K 1 t
K   t
K
= 0 1 = 0:
The case  () = 0 requires  !1. Similarly to above,
lim!1  (
) ( (1; )  E [])
= lim!1
PK
t=T C
K
t (1  F ())
t F ()K t
 
t
KE [j > 
] + K tK E [j < 
]  E []

= lim!1
PK
t=T C
K
t (1  F ())
t F ()K t tKE [j > 
]
= lim!1 ((1  F ())E [j > ]) lim!1 11 F ()
PK
t=T C
K
t (1  F ())
t t
K
= lim!1
R1
 xdF (x) lim!1
PK
t=T C
K
t (1  F ())
t 1 t
K = 0 0 = 0:
This concludes part (i). Parts (ii) and (iii) follow from the expression for  () and the observation
that  (1; ) > E [] for any  >  1.
Proof of Lemma 6: The rst statement follows from Lemma 5, which implies that shareholders
(managements) expected utility in any shareholder-friendly equilibrium is strictly higher (lower)
than in any management-friendly equilibrium. To prove the second statement, recall that gSH () and
gM () are linear functions. Then, for any 1 and 2,
WShareholders (

2) > WShareholders (

1)
,  (2) vSH (1) + g0SH  c (2) >  (1) vSH (1) + g0SH  c (1)
, ( (2)   (1))
vSH(1)
g0SH
> (c (1)  c (2)), ( (2)   (1))
vM (0)
 g0M
> (c (1)  c (2))
, (1   (2)) vM (0) + g0M  c (2) < (1   (1)) vM (0) + g0M  c (1)
,WManagement (2) < WManagement (1) ;
which proves Pareto e¢ ciency.
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